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BREACH OF CONTRACT, DAMAGE MEASURES, AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM*
For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every
word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether,
and other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored
by anything outside the law. We should lose the fossil records of a good
deal of history and the majesty got from ethical associations, but by
ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very much
in the clearness of our thought.t
[I]urisprudence inevitably rests on faith. . . . We cannot reject the
religion of the Bible and permanently retain our law and justice....
[L]aw is not safe unless it be related to the transcendent will or law of
God.1
I. INTRODUCTION: CONTRACT LAW AND CLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORY
The restructuring of the economic foundations of the Anglo-Amer-
ican world during the late 18th and the 19th centuries was accompanied
by development of a legal framework facilitating and an ideology
legitimating entrepreneurial activity. Although an action would lie
for breach of an informal promise as early as the 16th century,1
well-articulated rules of contract law were a product of later elabora-
don:
Our courts in the early nineteenth century were writing on a largely
clean slate. There is little in our law of contracts, for example, that has
any recognizable ancestry before 1800. The explanation for this is not
that we had discarded English law and were deliberately making a
fresh start: there was in fact no English law for us to discard and it
is quite as true of England as it is of the United States that the law in
this and in many other areas was a nineteenth century invention. Our
rules of contract came into existence in the course of the industrial
revolution .... 2
The fundamental postulates of contract law are thus inevitably
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law; A.B., Pittsburgh, 1960,
LL.B., 1963, Ph.D., 1967; LL.M., Harvard, 1965.
t Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897).
MICKLEM, LAW AND THE LAws 114, 119 (1952).
1. CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 8-11 (6th ed. 1964).
2. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1040 (1961).
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closely related to the premises of the free enterprise system.8 The
principle of freedom of contract in particular has shared support from
the Benthamite logic used to justify individual initiative:
Once admit that A, B, or C can each, as a rule, judge more correctly
than can any one else of his own interest, and the conclusion naturally
follows that, in the absence of force or fraud, A and B ought to be
allowed to bind themselves to one another by any agreement which
they each choose to make-i.e., which in the view of each of them pro-
motes his own interest, or, in other words, is conducive to his own
happiness. 4
But advocacy of party autonomy on moral grounds without reference
to utilitarian calculus was possible; Adam Smith claimed that to re-
strain people from entering voluntary transactions "is a manifest
violation of that natural liberty which it is the proper business of
law, not to infringe but to support . . . 5
Nevertheless the interrelationship between contract law and capital-
ism goes beyond a simple sharing of ideological foundations. Freedom
of contract, a prerequisite of market systems, is necessarily urged by
arguments supporting free enterprise.6 Although frequently defended
as in some sense morally right, the competitive ideal, or at least many
of its components, can be upheld without requiring substantial re-
liance on unverifiable value judgments. As a consequence, some prob-
lems of contract law usually handled through appeal to subjective
standards of justice can be dealt with by application of more neutral
principles. The need for such principles has been recognized:
Contract implies some kind of agreement of wills, as expressed between
two or several parties, on a common objective. But what more can we
say? Is there any compelling order, whether from outside or from within
the nature of the institution, telling us that there should be damages
for breach of contract only in the case of fault or in any situation of
default by one party? Can natural law tell us whether and under what
3. "[P]art of contract law is the counterpart, if not the product, of free-enterprise
capitalism. Contract, in this point of view, is the legal machinery appropriate to an
economic system which relies on free exchange rather than tradition and custom or
command for the distribution of resources." KESSLER & SHARP, CONTRACTS-CASES AND
MATERIALS 2 (1953). "The abstraction of classical contract law is not unrealistic; it is a
deliberate renunciation of the particular, a deliberate relinquishment of the temptation
to restrict untrammeled individual autonomy or the completely free market in the name
of social policy. The law of contract is, therefore, roughly coextensive with the free
market. Liberal nineteenth-century economics fits in neatly with the law of contracts so
viewed." FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA-A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 20
(1965).
4. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND
DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 150 (1930).
5. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 308
(Modern Library ed. 1937).
6. "[Flreedom of contract does not commend itself for moral reasons only; it ... is the
inevitable counterpart of a free enterprise system." Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943).
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circumstances a supervening change of circumstances should permit the
discharge of contractual obligations? Can it tell us whether a contract
concluded between parties of grossly unequal economic power should
be valid, voidable, or totally void?7
Restatement of legal doctrine in terms of weaker assumptions unidenti-
fied with concepts of fairness derived through introspection should
expedite dispute resolution even if substantive conclusions remain
generally unaltered. This paper seeks to derive a less value-laden
justification for the common law rule "that where a party sustains a loss
by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to
be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the
contract had been performed."8
II. THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
A. Just Price
Scholastic philosophers sought to evaluate economic aspects of medi-
eval life through application of what they believed to be divinely
established principles of proper conduct. Commercial transactions were
ideally regulated by desire on the part of the individual to avoid
unjust behavior which might threaten his salvation. An approved
price was considered not a morally neutral allocative mechanism but
a measure of intrinsic worth from which it was sin to deviate without
excuse:
[C]ertainly, whenever a little less is given or a little more received
knowingly, merely by reason of the act of buying or selling, where the
true value of the property is reasonably estimable in good faith, then
there is injustice in the sight of God. . . . [W]hatever the price de-
manded by the seller of goods, he must believe in good faith that he
has received by reason of the sale nothing beyond the just price ...
This principle is clear in the first place because without its application
equality of justice would not be preserved between the thing given and
the thing received, and in the second place it is obvious sound morality
in and of itself.9
One who violated such an economic standard could expect to pay
dearly for his material gain. 10 Although market forces undoubtedly
7. Friedmann, An Analysis of "In Defense of Natural Law," in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
144, 158-59 (Hook ed. 1964). Failure to base a decision on testable hypotheses can pre-
clude meaningful dialogue concerning its correctness: "Bryan got his simple Protestant
piety from his father, Silas Lillard Bryan, a country judge at Salem. Some of the judge's
decisions were upheld; some, reversed. About one of the latter, he once remarked: 'I
know I was right in that decision, because I consulted God about it.'" DE CAMP, THE
GREAT MONKEY TRIAL 35-36 (1968).
8. Robinson v. Harmon, 154 Eng. Rep. 363, 365 (Ex. 1848).
9. NIDER, ON THE CONTRACTS OF MERCHANTS 34, 39 (Reeves transl., Shuman ed. 1966).
10. "[A]II the saints and all the angels of paradise cry then against him, saying, 'To
hell, to hell, to hell.' Also the heavens with their stars cry out, saying, 'To the fire, to the
fire, to the fire.' The planets also clamor, 'To the depths, to the depths, to the depths.'"
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influenced and perhaps frequently determined what actions were
thought just, competition was valued primarily because scrutinization
of the parallel bargains of others mitigated potential dangers to the
soul resulting from personal miscalculation." Indeed, deductions from
ethical premises independent of considerations of supply and demand
were frequently accepted in spite of their potentially harmful impli-
cations:
[A] merchant ought to receive with caution a profit reasonably pro-
portioned to the nobility, seriousness, and usefulness of the care,
exertions, industry, and costs which he undertakes .... In proportion
to . . . essentiality, and other things being equal, the debt ought to
be measured.... For example, other things being equal, the purveying
of necessary food and clothing is of greater service to the community
of men than that of less useful items.1 2
B. Competitive Equilibrium
Expansion of trade and industry gradually led to the establishment
of a largely self-regulating market system. Over the last 2 centuries
economists have developed and refined a model of perfect competition
which seeks to describe this system by abstracting from it to isolate its
essential equilibrating mechanisms. The resulting ideal commodity
market, seldom approximately attainable even in the days of Adam
Smith, requires that:
(1) firms produce a homogeneous commodity, and consumers are iden-
tical from the sellers' point of view, in that there are no advantages
or disadvantages associated with selling to a particular consumer;
(2) both firms and consumers are numerous, and the sales or pur-
chases of each individual unit are small in relation to the aggregate
volume of transactions;
(3) both firms and consumers possess perfect information about the
prevailing price and current bids, and they take advantage of
every opportunity to increase profits and utility respectively;
(4) entry into and exit from the market is free for both firms and
consumers.'
a
Perfectly competitive factor markets must satisfy similarly rigorous
conditions:
St. Bernardine, De Evangelio Aeterno sermon 45, art. 3, c. 3, in 2 OPERA OMNIA (de la
Haye ed. 1745), quoted in NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY 77 (1957).
11. Just as they stand in less moral peril who deal in things which can be found and
bought from many sources, so [too] one ought to be much more an object of sus-
picion to himself [in weighing his own motives, that is] who has something unique
for sale or who exercises an office or type of work which cannot be found in anyone
else. This follows, first, because a fair estimate can be had more easily or more closely
when men are not constrained to deal with a single person. Where, however, a
monopoly situation exists, a man ought much more to be an object of suspicion to
himself and exercise great care not to drive another to extremes through his neces-
sity nor seek to receive more than the just value of his [the seller's] property or his
labor.
NIDER, supra note 9, at 44.
12. Id. at 19.
13. HENDERSON & QUANDT, MICROECONOMlC THEORY 86 (1958).
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(1) the input is homogeneous and the buyers are uniform from the
sellers' point of view,
(2) buyers and sellers are numerous,
(3) both buyers and sellers possess perfect information,
(4) both buyers and sellers are free to enter or leave the market. 14
Various markets must be linked by perfect knowledge of the character-
istics of their products or factors. As the number of economic units
operating within each market becomes very large, the change in com-
modity or factor prices as a result of variations in the behavior of any
individual unit will approach zero.
The consequences of perfect competition in the consuming sector
may be derived without difficulty. Retained primary factors, such as
labor, should be considered goods consumed. A consumer will max-
imize his satisfaction if, at the margin, the rate at which he is willing
to exchange any pair of goods is equal to the ratio of their market
prices. Since there is only one set of prices, the rate of exchange or
substitution between any two goods will be the same for all con-
sumers. 5 Parallel conditions prevail under perfect competition in
the producing sector. Profit maximization requires that the rate of
technical substitution between any two inputs and the rate of product
transformation between any two outputs equal their respective price
ratios. In addition, the rate at which an input can be transformed into
an output must equal the ratio of the prices of the input and the
output. Again the ratios will be identical for all economic units.'0
14. Id. at 107.
15. Assume that there exist m goods and n consumers. Let the utility function of the
i th consumer be
(1) U1 = Ui(q$1 ... qfm),
where q, is the quantity of the good k which he consumes. If p, is the price of good k.
equilibrium entails
0 qjk _PJ
(2) - (j, k = . m)
Oqa Pk
and
Oqjk Oqhk (i, h = 1, . . . , n)
(3)
aqjj aqbj (j, k = I . i.n. m).
The analysis in this footnote and in footnotes 16 and 22 relies heavily on HENDERSON
& QUANDT, supra note 13, at 202-08. Throughout the discussion second-order conditions
are assumed fulfilled. See id. at 257-83.
16. Let there be m goods and N firms. The production function of the h th firm may
be written
(4) Fh(qhl. q hm) = 0,
where qhk is an output if positive and an input if negative. Equilibrium entails
Oqhk Pj
(5) Pk
and
8 qhk 8 qik (i, h = 1 .... N)
(6)- -- 1 iaqhJ aqi j (, k = , ..... m).
1970]
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C. Pareto Optimality
Like determinations of just price, the economic realities idealized by
the competitive model have often been defended as an inevitable
consequence of immutable principles of justice: "It is not clear that
Adam Smith believed that laissez faire would carry the wealth of a
nation to some kind of theoretically-conceivable maximum. . . . [F]or
Adam Smith laissez faire, beyond its material benefits, had ethical or
moral value in that it left to the individual unimpaired that 'natural
system of liberty' to which he had a natural right.' 1 7 Yet economists,
aspiring to standards of objectivity set in the natural sciences, 18 have
been able to condemn violation of the conditions of competitive equi-
librium as inefficient with only minimal appeal to moral precepts.
The principal difficulty limiting the development of value-free eco-
nomic theory is the impossibility of making verifiable interpersonal
welfare comparisons. One can nevertheless differentiate, at least con-
ceptually, a set of states of the economy from which movement
benefiting any one individual may be made only at the cost of injury
to another. Such states are characterized as Pareto optimal.' 9 Although
choice among Pareto optimal states requires appeal to subjective
values, the superiority of at least one such state over any given state
outside the set may be defended as almost tautological. 20 Argument for
such optimality is essentially a plea for efficiency:
17. Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 45, 60 (1960).
Advocacy has often been less restrained: "It can ...be affirmed that thanks to the non-
intervention of the state in private affairs, wants and satisfactions would develop in their
natural order. . . .Away, then, with the quacks and the plannersl Away with their rings,
their chains, their hooks, their pincers Away with their artificial methodsl ...Let us
cast out all artificial systems and give freedom a chance-freedom, which is an act of
faith in God and in His handiwork." BASTIAT, The Law, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL
ECONOMY 51, 53, 96 (de Huszar ed. 1964). The frequency and meaninglessness of such
arguments in the domestic arena have led one American critic to describe "our beloved
free enterprise ideology" as "that centerpiece of national idiocy." BAZELON, POWER IN
AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF THE NEW CLASS 16 (1967).
18. "The economist, to maintain his self-respect, must hold fast to the faith that there
does exist an independent body of truth in his discipline, truth that can be discerned
independently of value judgments." BUCHANAN, Economics and Its Scientific Neighbors, in
THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 166, 179 (Krupp ed. 1966).
19. The concept was first isolated by the economist whose name it bears:
[C]onsider any particular position and suppose that a very small move is made [from
it] . . . . [Then if] the well-being of all the individuals is increased, it is evident
that the new position is more advantageous for each of them; vice versa it is less so
if the well-being of all the individuals is diminished. The well-being of some may
remain the same without these conclusions being affected. But if, on the other hand,
this small move increases the well-being of certain individuals, and diminishes that
of others, it can no longer be said that it is advantageous to the community as a
whole to make such a move.
PARETO, MANUEL D'TCONOMIE POLITIQUE 617-18 (1927), translated in HUTCHISON, A REVIEW
OF ECONOMIC DOCTRINES, 1870-1929, at 225 (1953).
20. This Pareto rule is itself an ethical proposition, a value statement, but it is one
which requires a minimum of premises and one which should command wide assent.
The rule specifically eliminates the requirement that interpersonal comparisons of
utility be made. As stated, however, a fundamental ambiguity remains in the rule.
Some objective content must be given to the terms "better off" and "worse off." This
[Vol. 24
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In all cases ... where a certain policy leads to an increase in physical
productivity, and thus of aggregate real income, the economist's case
for the policy is quite unaffected by the question of the comparability
of individual satisfactions; since in all such cases it is possible to make
everybody better off than before, or at any rate to make some people
better off without making anybody worse off.21
If constraints outside the formal structure of the model are disre-
garded, Pareto optimality requires satisfaction of the conditions of
the preceding sections. If each individual is presumed to possess some
of each good, violation of an equality in the consuming sector would
permit profit from further exchange; similar imbalance in the produc-
ing sector would allow an increase in the output of one good without a
concomitant reduction in the supply of another.22 In equilibrium, the
consumer rate of substitution must equal the producer rate of substi-
tution or transformation for any pair of goods, since each is equal
is accomplished by equating "better off" with "in that position voluntarily chosen."
Individual preferences are taken to indicate changes in individual well-being, and a
man is said to be better off when he voluntarily changes his position from A to B
when he could have remained in A.
Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, 2 J. LAw &
ECON. 124, 125 (1959).
21. Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparison of Util-
ity, 49 EcoN. J. 549, 550 (1939).
22. Assume that the economy includes only two consumers and two goods. The utility
functions of note 15 supra may then be restated as Ul(qllq, 2 ) and U2 (q21,q 2 2), where q11
+ q2 1= qO and q, 2 + q22 = qO. Let the second consumer enjoy a constant level of satis-
faction U. Write.
(7) U; = Ul(qll, q12) + k[U2 (q ° - q,, q0 - q 2) - 0
where k is a Lagrange multiplier. Set the partial derivatives of this function equal to 0:
aU* aU 1  0U 2(8) - X 0
aq,, aq11 aq11
aU1  aU, aU2
(9) - = - - k- = 0aq 12 aq 12 aq 12
a U , 0 0 0
(10) - = U 2 (q, - 111, q2 - q1 2) - U 2 = 0.
The utility of the first consumer will be maximized, given the level of satisfaction of the
second, if these conditions are satisfied. Optimality thus requires
aUl/aql1 _ U 2/aq 1,(U1/aq1 2  0U 2 /0q 12
The left and right sides of equation (11) are the rates of substitution between goods of
the first and second consumers respectively. The necessity of satisfaction of the conditions
of note 16 supra can be similarly demonstrated.
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to the ratio of the prices of the goods. This requirement precludes
profit in an economic sense: Consequent divergence between return to
the worker for sacrifice of leisure and gain to the entrepreneur in
terms of added output would restrict labor input to a suboptimal level.
Taxation will generally cause similar distortion.
Acceptance of these conclusions does not require retreat to laissez-
faire principles. Although Pareto optimality is a characteristic of any
equilibrium which maximizes community utility, this characteristic
is shared by an infinite set of economic states.2 Indeed, if the marginal
utility of money to the individual declines significantly as income
increases,24 distribution patterns associated with perfect competition
are likely to reduce community welfare substantially below levels
obtainable through efficient controls which promote equality at some
cost in terms of output.25 Moreover, to stigmatize a state of the econ-
omy as not Pareto optimal is not to assert that a shift to a given
Pareto optimum, for example that of perfect competition, will raise
welfare. Nor is movement toward competition inevitably beneficial
even if the competitive system is assumed ideal; if some aspects of a
system are constrained to nonmaximizing levels, there is no reason
to assert that satisfaction of other conditions of optimality will neces-
sarily prove advantageous. 26 Nevertheless, "what can be persuasively
argued-perhaps even 'proved' . . . -is that random interferences
with the working of a competitive market will make it a less efficient
organizer of economic activity." 27
23. "[C]ompetitive equilibrium is such that not everyone can be made better off by any
intervention .... There are literally an infinite number of equilibrium states just as
'efficient' as that of laissez-faire individualism. Such an efficiency state is a necessary but
not sufficient (repeat, not) condition for maximization of a social-welfare function."
Samuelson, Modern Economic Realities and Individualization, TEXAS Q., Summer 1963 at
128, 131, reprinted in 2 SAMUELSON, COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS 1407, 1410 (1966).
24. "Happiness will not go on increasing in anything near the same proportion as
wealth.... It will even be a matter of doubt whether ten thousand times the wealth will
in general bring with it twice the happiness .... Happiness produced by a particle of
wealth ...will be less and less at every particle." BENTHAM, Pannomial Fragments, in
3 WORKS 211, 229 (Tait ed. 1843). But see MUSCRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE
102-05 (1959).
25. Perfect competition represents a welfare optimum in the narrow sense of fulfilling
the requirements of Pareto optimality.
An additional difficulty is introduced by the fact that the analysis of Pareto op-
timality accepts the prevailing income distribution .... The problem of finding an
optimal income distribution is not considered .... The analysis of welfare in terms
of Pareto optimality leaves a considerable amount of indeterminacy in the solution:
there are an infinite number of points ...which are Pareto-optimal. . . . In order
to judge the relative social desirability of alternative points ...society must make
additional value judgments which state its preferences among alternative ways of
allocating satisfaction to individuals. Value judgments are ethical beliefs and are not
the subject of economic analysis.
HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note 13, at 208.
26. Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUDIEs 11
(1956).
27. Viner, supra note 17, at 64.
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III. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND DAMAGE MEASURES
A. The Traditional Standard
Enforcement of contractual obligations has long been premised, at
least in part, on the argument "that a promise has inherent moral
force and should be recognized by the law .... -28 Three centuries ago,
Hobbes asserted that "the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than
the not performance of Covenant."29 The belief that repudiation of
an agreement is a moral wrong retains vitality in spite of attenuation
of the religious certitudes which once supported it:
Why should promises be enforced?
The simplest answer is that of the intuitionists, namely, that promises
are sacred per se, that there is something inherently despicable about
not keeping a promise, and that a properly organized society should
not tolerate 'this....
Now there can be no doubt that common sense does generally find.
something revolting about the breaking of a promise . . . . [L]et us
not ignore the fact that judges and jurists, like other mortals, do
frequently express this in the feeling that it would be an outrage to
let one who has broken his promise escape completely.3 °
Nevertheless social condemnation did not induce imposition of
punitive sanctions upon the purported wrongdoer: "In fixing the
amount of ... damages, the general purpose of the law is, and should
be, to give compensation: -that is, to put the plaintiff in as good a
position as he would have been in had the defendant kept his con-
tract." 3' Since "the recapture of profit made through breach of contract
. . . has been brushed aside as an objective of our remedial system,"32
conduct deemed reprehensible seems almost to receive approbation if
not encouragement from the law. Scholars have had little success in
exploring this apparent anomaly: "The rule is now beyond doubt,
but no very convincing reason has been given for it .... 3
28. PATON, A TEXT-BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 296 (1946). "The faithful observance of
contracts . . . is . . . essential to the public welfare .... Property rights, public and
private morality, and liberty itself, are insecure, when the law encourages the nonob-
servance of contract obligations." Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery
Light & Water Power Co., 171 F. 553, 561 (C.C. M.D. Ala. 1909).
29. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 71 (1st ed. 1651).
30. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571-72 (1933). In Hindu
law "a debt is not merely an obligation but a sin, the consequences of which follow the
debtor into the next world." One who does not repay "will be born hereafter in his
creditor's house, a slave, a servant, a quadruped, or a woman." MAYNE, TREATISE ON
HINDU LAW AND USAGE 405, 406 (10th ed. 1938).
31. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (rev. ed. 1937). Thus, in Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9
(1859), the court stated: "The violation of most contracts involves a breach of faith." Id.
at 11. It nevertheless held: "[T]here was error in charging the jury that .. . they might
also allow damages 'for violation of faith.' This is something more than compensation. It
is an allowance of vindictive damages, which is not permitted in actions for a breach of
contract . . . ." Id.
32. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 189 (1959).
33. SALMOND & WINFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 510 (1927).
1970]
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Attempts to explicate protection of the various interests of the
nonbreaching party in terms of natural justice result in a similar
though less striking indeterminateness. Demands for restitution of
gains made by the breaching party at the expense of his innocent
promisee can hardly be resisted as inordinate.34 In some systems the
formal remedy for breach of contract does not sanction recovery beyond
this point.35 Claims founded on injury suffered through reliance on
a broken promise may also appear justified even though no concomitant
benefit to the party who has not fulfilled his obligations can be
demonstrated. But compensation for loss of profits which the innocent
party would have received if his promisor had performed seems less
essential:
[T]he promisee who has actually relied on the promise, even though he
may not thereby have enriched the promisor, certainly presents a more
pressing case for relief than the promisee who merely demands satisfac-
tion for his disappointment in not getting what was promised him. In
passing from compensation for change of position to compensation
for loss of expectancy . . . [t]he law no longer seeks merely to heal a
disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a new situation ...
With the transition, the justification for legal relief loses its self-evident
quality. It is as a matter of fact no easy thing to explain why the normal
rule of contract recovery should be that which measures damages by
the value of the promised performance.36
B. Toward Objectivity
Legal scholars have frequently attempted to exclude from their
analysis judgments which lack "a generally accepted public sensory
test of validity'. ...- Holmes, who wished to "get rid of the whole
moral phraseology which . . . has tended to distort the law,"' 8 was
especially unwilling to apply ethical principles to contract law:
34. "For this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another's
loss." DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, lib. 12, tit. 6, § 14, quoted in Nordstrom & Woodland, Re-
covery by Building Contractor in Default, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 193 (1959).
35. 3. A contract may be revoked by either party in a position to do so, or to put it
more exactly, a man cannot take action against another for withdrawal from a
promise to perform provided that restitution of the original consideration is made.
Thus a man who has taken a bullock for a future heifer may withdraw from the
contract by returning the bullock or its equivalent. With certain limitations upon the
freedom of women, this proposition applies even to the marriage contract.
5. No contract implies a time clause. There is no means other than moral suasion
to force a person to perform within a limited time. A man may have to go to con-
siderable lengths to enforce performance on a contract; however, in a community of
men known personally to one another, moral forces serve to press conformity to ex-
pectations ....
GOLoSCHMInT, SEBEI LAw 188 (1967).
36. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56-
57 (1936).
37. Knight, The Pragmatic Conception of Justice, 72 ETHIcs 57, 59 (1961).
38. Letter from O.W. Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock, May 30, 1927, in 2 HOLMES-
PoLLocc LETTErS 200 (Howe ed. 1941).
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Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest
than in the law of contract.... The duty to keep a contract at common
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep
it,-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a
compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a
compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is
all the difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in
the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics
into the law as they can.
39
He defended his position by appeal to Bromage v. Genning,40 where
Coke said that to decree specific performance of a covenant to grant
a lease "would subvert the intention of the covenantor, when he
intends it to be at his election either to lose the damages or to make
the lease . ... ,,41 Pollock disagreed: "The inventors of assumpsit
clearly thought that breach of contract was wrong-not merely an
election to pay damages rather than perform." 42
The difficulty with extraction of value judgments from legal reason-
ing is that frequently only a sterile taxonomic structure remains.
Discarded appeals to introspection must be replaced by other points of
reference. The success of capitalism during the 19th century, manifested
by the rise of England to industrial and political preeminence and
rapid American growth, added an objective component to the con-
siderations of natural justice which had been instrumental in the
development of contract law. Recognition of the material benefits of
free enterprise motivated efforts to facilitate competition through
development of appropriate legal controls. Although assertions of
efficacy were frequently diluted through retention of moral phrase-
ology, 43 many recognized the importance to economic activity of "the
39. Holmes, The Path o1 the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
40. 81 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1616).
41. Id.; DAWSON & HARVEY, CONTRACTS AND CONTRACT REMEDIES 94 (1959).
42. Letter from Sir Frederick Pollock to O.W. Holmes, Sept. 17, 1897, in 1 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS 79-80 (Howe ed. 1941). He argued: "[I]f the obligation is, as you main-
tain, only alternative, how can it be wrong to procure a man to break his contract, which
would then be only procuring him to fix his lawful election in one. way rather than
another? . . .Lumley v. Gye, and your cases as well as ours which have confirmed it,
would be all wrong." Id. at 80. Other critics have attacked on a more formalistic level:
"The duty of the promisor is, with due respect to Justice Holmes, to perform his
promise, but by the exercise of a power he may in certain cases convert this duty into a
liability. The exercise of a power in such case is wrongful but effectual; for it is of the
essence of a power that it may alter, divest, or create rights." Note, The "Right" To
Break a Contract, 16 MicH. L. REv. 106, 109 (1917).
43. "[Under the influence of the classical economists, freedom of contract becomes a
sacred thing .... [T]o thinking men contract is not simply important; it is everything, or
at least everything that is good." HAVICHURsT, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 19-20
(1961).
The individualism of our rules of contract law, of which freedom of contract is the
most powerful symbol, is closely tied up with the ethics of free enterprise capitalism
and the ideals of justice of a mobile society of small enterprisers, individual merchants
and independence craftsmen . . . . [This society] was firmly convinced of a natural
law according to which the individual serving his own interest was also serving the
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guarantee of the law that enterprise or speculation, in so far as it
implies contracts for labour, goods, or shares, will be protected by the
award of damages or specific performance." 44 They came to "view
the law of contract as directed to strengthening the security of trans-
actions by enabling men to rely more fully on promises . . .,.
C. Rule Efficiency
Scholars frequently urge stability of commitment as a primary goal
of contract law. Havighurst assumes "that as a rule the social interest
is served when promises are performed .... ,46Dawson notes, seem-
ingly with some regret, that "prevention of profit through mere breach
of contract is not yet an approved aim of our legal order ... .-47 Such
emphasis would appear misplaced. Pursuit of this value ultimately
compels renunciation of individual autonomy and reversion to social
forms stressing status.
Mueller notes: "[I]t is an open secret that a contract breaker rarely
stands to lose as much by his breach as he would by performance.
And the more deliberate the breach, the more apt he is to gain. ' 4
Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor
is able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in as good
a position as he would have occupied had performance been rendered.
Failure to honor an agreement under these circumstances is a move-
ment toward Pareto optimality: "Once the costs of carrying out
market transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a rear-
rangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the
value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater
than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about.' 49 To
penalize such adjustments through overcompensation of the innocent
party is to discourage efficient reallocation of community resources.
interest of the community .... The play of the market if left to itself must ...
maximize net satisfactions. Justice within this framework has a very definite meaning.
It means freedom of property and of contract, of profit making and of trade. Freedom
of contract thus received its moral justification .... [A] social system based on free-
dom of enterprise and perfect competition sees to it that the "private autonomy" of
contracting parties will be kept within bounds and will work out to the benefit of
the whole.
Kessler, supra note 6, at 640.
44. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANCING SOCIETY 91 (1959).
45. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 102 (1933). "Now, as much of the business of
human life turns or moves upon conventions, frequent disappointments of those expec-
tations which conventions naturally excite, would render human society a scene of
baffled hopes, and of thwarted projects and labours. To prevent disappointments of such
expectations, is therefore a main object of the legal and moral rules whose direct and
appropriate purpose is the enforcement of pacts or agreements." 1 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 299-300 (2d ed. 1861).
46. HAVICHURST, supra note 43, at 64.
47. Dawson, supra note 32, at 187.
48. Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REV.
833, 835.
49. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 15-16 (1960).
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Identical consequences follow from condemnation of breach of con-
tract on moral grounds.50 Rigidity resulting from thus binding a
party to his undertaking limits the factor and product mobility essen-
tial to proper functioning of the market mechanism. Fulfillment of
the conditions set out in part II above is therefore precluded.
Disagreement with these conclusions can generally be reduced to
a concern that the damage remedy does not adequately compensate the
innocent promisee. The traditional measure, closely associated with
the oversimplifications of competitive theory, indeed falls short of
perfection:
The law of contract damages took into account only generalized types
of economic damage, ignoring any personal element (for example,
embarrassment or humiliation resulting from breach of contract).
Recoverable damages for breach of contract to deliver goods were
computed on the basis of the difference between contract price and
market price at the moment of breach. This formula assumed a friction-
less and perfect market, operating instantaneously and universally. 5'
Assumed absence of transaction costs is particularly unrealistic: An
efficient damage standard may do nothing more than lower negotiating
expense, since presumably the bound party confronted with a more
attractive opportunity can buy his freedom by offering to share the
gain with his promisee. Objections of undercompensation do not sup-
port punishment or condemnation of one who repudiates an agree-
ment; at most, they urge reevaluation of the success of the courts in
implementing what is conceded to be the general rule of recovery.
Efficiency demands that the breaching party bear the transaction costs
which accompany his actions.
A parallel argument requires protection of the expectation interest
of the innocent promisee. Contracts are formed because cooperation
offers opportunity of gain to the parties jointly. Optimal division of
this joint gain cannot be determined without comparison of individual
utility schedules. If recovery for breach of contract were limited to
protection of restitution and reliance interests, a party could frequently
profit through repudiation of one agreement and entry into another
offering him a larger share of a smaller joint gain.
The conclusion that efficiency requires a measure of damages for
breach of contract which places the innocent party in as good a posi-
tion as he would have been in if default had not occurred rests largely
50. The breaker of the typical indisputable promise must be brazen .... Thus quite
apart from law, many persons who will furtively steal will not openly refuse to keep
a promise as to which it is impossible to manufacture a plausible ground of dispute.
• . . [A]ithough the social sanctions applicable to breach of contract are not so severe
as those attaching to detected dishonesty, they are substantial, tangible and certain.
The man who does not keep his promises is not exactly a pariah, but he loses much
that the great majority of people find essential to an agreeable existence.
HAVIGHURsr, supra note 43, at 71.
51. FRimMAN, supra note 3, at 21.
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in the presumed relevance of the competitive model to the modern
market system. It is obvious, however, that the problems considered
arise from nonfulfillment of the conditions of perfect competition.
Indeed, the bilateral contract would itself serve no function if the
requirements of the model were satisfied. Opportunity cost would
equate reliance and expectation interests:
If we rest the legal argument for measuring damages by the expectancy
on the ground that this procedure offers the most satisfactory means of
compensating the plaintiff for the loss of other opportunities to con-
tract, it is clear that . . . [i]t would be most forceful in a hypothetical
society in which all values were available on the market and where all
markets were "perfect" in the economic sense. In such a society . . .
[t]he plaintiff's loss in foregoing to enter another contract would be
identical with the expectation value of the contract he did make.52
The argument thus rests rather tenuously on the assumption that
competitive conditions are violated but that divergence from the ideal
is not so complete that attempts to strengthen the market mechanism
are futile.
IV. ILLUSTRATION: THE COMMON LAW LABOR CONTRACT
A. Defaulting Employee
In Britton v. Turner,53 plaintiff, having agreed to labor for the
defendant for 1 year at a wage of $120, voluntarily abandoned his
employment after 9 months and 18 days. The trial judge instructed
the jury that plaintiff could recover the value of his services in quantum
meruit in spite of his having left without good cause. The jury
awarded the plaintiff $95, apparently valuing his labor at approx-
imately the contract rate. Judgment was entered on the verdict.
In spite of warning by defendant's counsel that "[t]o hold out
inducements to men to violate their contracts, when fairly entered
into, is of immoral tendency,' 54 the judgment was affirmed on appeal.
Noting that a refusal to permit recovery could place one who com-
pletely disregards his obligation in a better position than one who
attempts performance, the court asserted: "[T]he general understand-
ing of the community is, that the hired laborer shall be entitled to
compensation for the service actually performed, though he does not
52. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 36, at 62. In Flureau v. Thornhill, 96 Eng. Rep. 635
(C.P. 1776), opportunity cost perhaps exceeded anticipated profit: "The loss of bargain
which the plaintiff sought to recover was evidently not the difference between the market
value of the real estate and the contract price but was, instead, the difference between
the selling price of stock (which the plaintiff had liquidated in order to make the pur-
chase) at the time of the sale and the price of that stock at the time the plaintiff learned
that the defendant did not have good title to the real estate." Nordstrom, Toward a Law
of Damages, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 86, 99 (1966).
53. 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
54. Id. at 485.
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continue the entire term contracted for, and such contracts must be
presumed to be made with reference to that understanding, unless
an express stipulation shows the contrary." 5 Recovery at a rate above
that specified in the contract was prohibited. Defendant, who did
not plead injury in the present action, was left free to sue separately
for damages resulting from the plaintiff's breach. The court, reasoning
that its solution would promote harmony between the contracting
parties, urged:
This rule, by binding the employer to pay the value of the service
he actually receives, and the laborer to answer in damages where he
does not complete the entire contract, will leave no temptation to
the former to drive the laborer from his service, near the close of his
term, by ill treatment, in order to escape from payment; nor to the
latter to desert his service before the stipulated time, without a suffi-
cient reason .... 56
The rule of Britton v. Turner has not been fully accepted in a
majority of American jurisdictions. Wider explicit adoption has prob-
ably been prevented not by opposing concepts of fairness but by
infrequent litigation of such problems in recent decades.5 7 The Re-
statement of Contracts would, in general, deny recovery of unappor-
tioned payments by the defaulting employee when his "breach or
non-performance is . . . wilful and deliberate . . .,,5
Such a position receives support primarily from classical authorities.
In the early case of Stark v. Parker,59 the court concluded that to
allow recovery by the worker would be "a flagrant violation of the
first principles of justice. ' °6 0 It stated:
Courts of justice are eminently characterized by their obligation and
office to enforce the performance of contracts, and to withhold aid
and countenance from those who seek, through their instrumentality,
impunity or excuse for the violation of them. And it is no less repugnant
to the well established rules of civil jurisprudence, than the dictates
of moral sense, that a party who deliberately and understandingly
55. Id. at 493. "The opinion in Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, was written by Chief
Justice Parker, and when his portrait was afterward painted for the State of New Hamp-
shire, the distinguished jurist animated by a just pride, had the artist show him seated
with an open volume before him and his index finger resting upon 6 N.H. at p. 481."
Quoted in FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 44 n.2 (1964).
56. 6 N.H. at 494.
57. See 5A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1127 (1964).
58. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357(l)(a) (1932). "This section is intended to lay down
a rule opposed to that adopted by the court in Britton v. Turner." FULLER & BRAUCHER,
supra note 55, at 48. An exception permits recovery when "the defendant, with knowledge
that the plaintiff's breach of duty or non-performance of condition has occurred or will
thereafter occur, assents to the rendition of the part performance, or accepts the benefit
of it, or retains property received although its return in specie is still not unreasonably
difficult or injurious." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357(l)(b) (1932).
59. 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 267 (1824).
60. Id. at 274.
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enters into an engagement and voluntarily breaks it, should be per-
mitted to make that very engagement the foundation of a claim to
compensation for services under it.61
Similarly, in Haslack v. Mayers,62 the court ruled: "The plaintiff here
has deliberately broken his covenant with the defendant .... For the
court to aid him, would be to lend its aid to an act of bad faith ...
Let him perform his contract . . .or . . the loss is the consequence
of his own act."'63
Woodward asserted that "perhaps the strongest argument that can
be urged against the rule" is that "denying a recovery is unjust in
that its effect is to enable the defendant to retain a sum in excess of
adequate compensatory damages for the plaintiff's breach. ' 64 He never-
theless stated:
[W]hen it is remembered that the plaintiff's position is the direct
consequence of a willful and inexcusable violation of his legal and
moral duty to the defendant, it is difficult to feel that the result com-
plained of is harsh or unjust. . . . [E]ven if some hardship to the
plaintiff were conceded, the argument, it is submitted, would be
distinctly outweighed by the consideration that the denial of relief
must have a salutary effect in discouraging the willful breach of
contractual obligations. 65
He noted that even the New Hampshire court has admitted that its
rule induces a "direct tendency to the willful and careless violation
of express contracts fairly entered into." 66
Nontechnical arguments against recovery by a willfully defaulting
employee either appeal to concepts of morality or allege that preclusion
of relief will benefit the community by encouraging fulfillment of
contractual obligations. Proponents of Britton v. Turner defend its
doctrine primarily through assertions that fairness compels restitution.
Claims concerning the justness of the rule or its converse largely
offset each other. Opposition to recovery on the ground that voluntary
nonperformance is socially injurious is misguided. In many cases the
employee will leave his position for another offering greater remuner-
ation. Assuming suit follows, the consequent increase in pay will
not advantage the employee if the original employer can show, usually
through proving the cost of replacement, that damages resulting from
transfer equal or exceed this gain. Breach of contract will be improb-
able in these circumstances regardless of the likelihood of quasi-
contractual recovery for services rendered.
On the other hand, repudiation of the agreement should be encour-
61. Id. at 271.
62. 26 N.J.L. 284 (Sup. Ct. 1857).
63. Id. at 290-91.
64. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACrs 272 (1913).
65. Id.
66. Davis v. Barrington, 30 N.H. 517, 529 (1855); see WOODWARD, supra note 64, at 274.
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aged where gain to the employee will exceed loss to the employer.
Such a situation will normally arise where the particular skills of
the employee can be more fully utilized in his second position. Here
transfer will produce social gain through more efficient allocation of
labor. If jobs or workers are identical, replacement of the repudiating
employee without payment of the wage he will receive in his new
position appears unlikely. Under these conditions, however, increased
transaction costs can cause social injury. In general, reallocation bene-
fits should substantially exceed losses due to friction. Such losses
should of course be borne by the breaching party.
Refusal to permit recovery for services rendered by the employee
which are not counterbalanced by damages resulting from his breach
tends to lock him to his job by making transfer to a better position
less profitable or even unprofitable. Resulting divergence between
prospective worth to society and anticipated personal gain precludes
Pareto optimality. Efficient adjustment of factors of production to
changes in demand and supply is thus impeded. 67
B. Defaulting Employer
In James v. Board of Commissioners,"8 plaintiff was hired by de-
fendant at a wage of $100 per month to supervise until completion of
the stone and brick work in the construction of a courthouse. Wrong-
fully discharged while the work was in progress, plaintiff recovered
the promised remuneration for a subsequent period of approximately
2 months. He then brought another action seeking payment for an
additional 2 months. Defendant, alleging that the prior recovery barred
the second action, received judgment on the pleadings at the trial
level.
On appeal, the court framed the issue as "whether ... the employee
can, after being discharged . . .maintain an action for each install-
ment as though earned upon an allegation of readiness to perform
the work; or whether his action is simply one for damages for the
employer's breach of contract, and he is limited to one action ...."69
67. More substantial disincentives formerly prevailed. In England, breach by the em-
ployee could be punished by imprisonment until the late 19th century. See Avins, In-
voluntary Servitude in British Commonwealth Law, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 29 (1967);
Dodd, From Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages: Six Centuries of Regulation of Em-
ployment Contracts, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 643, 651 (1943). Employers have not been the
sole favored group. The Twelve Tables, for example, provided "that the body of the de-
faulting Roman debtor might be cut into pieces and divided pro rata among his cred-
itors," HAVIGHURST, supra note 43, at 86. As late as 1360, a money-changer was beheaded
in Barcelona because he had failed to pay his creditors. MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE MED-
ITERRANEAN WORLD 290 (Lopez & Raymond eds. 1955). The prospect of loss of seniority
rights today discourages labor mobility. See, e.g., BEAL & WICKERsHAM, THE PRACTICE OF
CoLEcrvE BARGAINING 557 (rev. ed. 1963).
68. 44 Ohio St. 226, 6 N.E. 246 (1886).
69. Id. at 229-30, 6 N.E. at 247.
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Support for plaintiff's position was garnered from Strauss v. Meertief,70
where the court, elaborating the doctrine of constructive service, stated
that the employee need not accept his dismissal as termination of the
contract but "may elect to treat it as continuing, and, keeping himself
in readiness to perform the contract on his part, may recover the wages
due on the expiration of the term .... And if the wages are payable by
installments, he may sue for and recover each installment, as it be-
comes due. ' 71 In James, plaintiff argued that to preclude recovery
"would entail great injustice"; 72 the court agreed that "the doctrine
contended for appeals strongly to the feelings . . .,,"
Judgment for defendant was nevertheless affirmed. The court relied
on language from Howard v. Daly:74
This doctrine is ... so wholly irreconcilable to that great and benefi-
cient rule of law, that a person discharged from service must not remain
idle, but must accept employment elsewhere if offered, that we cannot
accept it .... The doctrine of "constructive service" is not only at war
with principle, but with the rules of political economy, as it encourages
idleness and gives compensation to men who fold their arms and de-
cline service, equal to those who perform with willing hands their
stipulated amount of labor. Though the master has committed a
wrong, the servant is not for one moment released from the rule that
he should labor; and no rule can be sound which gives him full wages
while living in voluntary idleness.75
The James court concluded that only damages could be recovered,
and that under "the universal rule that a person injured by the act
of another is bound to use ordinary diligence to make the damage as
light as may be, the discharged employe must ...use ordinary effort
to obtain similar employment in the same vicinity."'76 It further as-
serted that "[p]ublic policy, not to say public morals, forbids the
encouragement of an idle class .... It would be a direct encouragement
to idleness to hold that he who may have, but refuses, similar service,
is entitled to full compensation the same as though he performed full
labor.' '
The reasoning of the court appears to rest on the twin assumptions
that work is a moral duty and that work is economically beneficial
to the community. The inability to isolate the importance of each
assumption is due to the failure of the court adequately to differentiate
them. The approach, perhaps explicable in terms of class conflict, is
reminiscent of that adopted in early programs for the poor:
70. 64 Ala. 299 (1879).
71. Id. at 307.
72. 44 Ohio St. at 231, 6 N.E. at 248.
73. Id.
74. 61 N.Y. 862 (1875).
75. Id. at 373-74.
76. 44 Ohio St. at 233-34, 6 N.E. at 250.
77. Id.
[Vol. 24
CONTRACT POLICY
When these children are four years old, they shall be sent to the
country work-house and there be taught to read two hours a day, and
be kept full employed the rest of their time, in any of the manufactures
of the house, which best suits their age, strength and capacity. If it
should be objected that, at these early years, they cannot be made
useful, I reply, that at four years of age, there are sturdy employments
in which children can earn their living; but besides that, there is a
very considerable use in their being, somehow or other, constantly
employed, at least, twelve hours a day, whether they earn their living
or not; for by these means, we hope that the rising generation will be
so habituated to constant employment that it would, at length, prove
agreeable and entertaining to them. 78
The conclusion of the court is nevertheless correct. If unaccom-
panied by imposition of a duty to seek other work, a rule permitting
recovery of the promised remuneration less earnings during the con-
tract period would normally eliminate all gain to the dismissed em-
ployee from labor presumably beneficial to the community. If the
stipulated wage were paid regardless of other earnings, incentive to
seek work could be largely retained. Here, however, the employer
would be discouraged from making socially advantageous changes in
his labor force; an individual would usually be retained unless his
presence actually lowered output.
Limitation of recovery through adherence to the general damage
measure implies award of the difference between the contract wage
and what the worker is able to earn through available comparable
employment. Application of this rule, adopted by the court, pro-
motes mobility of labor essential to competitive efficiency. If the value
of a worker hired at a salary of $10,000 falls to $8,000, an employer
will gain through repudiation of their agreement when the resulting
cost to him is less than $2,000. If transaction costs are disregarded,
breach will thus be profitable to the employer if and only if the worker
can obtain another job paying more than $8,000. A new employer will
not normally pay the worker more than what he anticipates his ser-
vices will contribute to the undertaking. The rule therefore encourages
breach where the product of the worker would be greater in an
alternative position and discourages breach where the product would
be less. Movement toward Pareto optimality is facilitated.
Unavailability of comparable employment implies distortions of the
78. TEMPLE, AN ESSAY ON TRADE AND COMMERCE 266-67 (1770).
Less than a hundred years ago the merchants and shipowners of Boston were able to
answer the demand of their employees for a ten-hour day with the argument that
"the habits likely to be generated by this indulgence in idleness . . . will be very
detrimental to the journeymen individually and very costly to us as a community."
Fifty years ago a United States Commissioner of Patents, Mortimer D. Leggett, de-
dared amid the applause of well-meaning persons that "idleness . . . stimulates vice
in all its forms and throttles every attempt at intellectual, moral, and religious
culture."
THE TWENTiES-FoRDS, FLAPPERS & FANATICS 46 (Mowry ed. 1963).
1970]
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
market mechanism sufficiently severe to preclude satisfactory solution -,
through application of criteria of economic efficiency. Absence of a
requirement that the employee accept an inferior position or work in
another locality is probably justified because subjective losses resulting
from such a shift are likely to be both large and difficult to compute.
Similar considerations urge limitation of recovery by the employee to
a sum not exceeding the contract wage.
V. CONCLUSION
The general damage remedy for breach of contract, which seeks to
place the injured party in as good a position as he would have occupied
if the agreement had been performed, has usually been defended
through an appeal to subjective concepts of natural justice. A less
introspective justification is available. Such protection of the expecta-
tion interest is also dictated by considerations of economic efficiency,
since it encourages optimal reallocation of factors of production and
goods without causing material instability of expectations. More rig-
orous adherence to this standard would promote proper functioning
of the market mechanism. Encouragement of repudiation where profit-
able through elimination of moral content from the contract promise
might also be socially desirable.
